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Executive Summary
The need to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 means that Britain's
energy systems must evolve rapidly so as to meet future requirements, and to cope 
with the considerably greater variability of renewable energy supplies. Ofgem will
have a key role to play in advising government and in the planning and
development of the energy infrastructure decision-making process necessary for
this to happen. This will require a much higher level of communication and
interaction between stakeholders, analysts and decision-makers. Further, the
current fairly mechanistic decision-making processes will themselves need to be
replaced by more flexible procedures in which the exercise of considerably more
judgement will be required. As a consequence, more strategic control of the
decision-making process will be needed. There needs to be, inter alia, more
attention given to both the specification and development of appropriate future
scenarios, and their ensuing analysis. Whether this strategic control should be
exercised by Ofgem, BEIS, or elsewhere in government, probably with the advice of
the Committee on Climate Change, is unclear; but it should be recognised that 
some decisions concerning regulation in the shorter term have the potential to 
constrain the UK’s longer term net-zero strategy. The reliance on just four FES
scenarios for planning is unlikely to illuminate all the issues relating to the UK’s net-
zero strategy, particularly when the development and maintenance of these 
scenarios is not under the direct control of Ofgem or another body with a public 
service remit.  Moreover, the analysis relating to planning and development in the
context of developing a net-zero strategy is likely to need more resource than 
Ofgem has used in the past.
In the report, the following issues are discussed:
• The management of uncertainty
• Scenario definition and scenario-focused decision analysis
• Robustness and sensitivity considerations
• Concerns about the use of least worse regret analyses
Recommendations
Ofgem's role in future infrastructure decision-making
In order to fulfil its future planning, development and regulatory functions within the
rapid evolution of Britain's energy infrastructure, and to ensure sound, auditable
decision-making, Ofgem should take more control of the analytical and decision-
making processes themselves. Particularly it needs to ensure that these are
correctly aligned with consumer and societal objectives. (Section 1)
Management of the analytical and decision-making processes
Serious thought should be given to the structuring and management of the analysis 
and decision-making processes. Ofgem should ensure that it has sufficient control
of these so as to be able to ensure that they satisfy its planning, development and 
regulatory requirements.  Analysis, including the scenarios to be used and the 
robustness and sensitivity analysis to be performed, needs to be agreed between
decision makers and analysts in advance, and larger analysis teams are likely to be 
required.  In particular, there needs to be provision for ongoing interaction between
all the parties involved. (Sections 3.1, 3.2)
 
               
     
     
  
       
       
      
      
    
  
  
             
          
  
    
     
  
    
  
        
       
   
       
         
      
         
      
             
   
  
  
         
   
  
      
   
  
 
    
 
    
             
 
      
     
Uncertainties 
At the outset of any project, uncertainties should be clearly set out and their natures
determined. The methods of handling these uncertainties should be agreed.  Deep
uncertainties (those which may not or should not be probabilistically quantified) will
require a particularly considered approach to their analysis.  (Section 2.1)
Need for thorough documentation of analysis
Very clear and complete documentation should be provided of all modelling and 
analysis. This should include full specification of models, assumptions, scenario 
and decision spaces, objectives, constraints, decision-making criteria, and
robustness and sensitivity analysis.  The standard of documentation should be such
that the analysis is fully capable of being reproduced, and the conclusions verified.  
(Section 3.3)
Scenario definition 
Scenarios should fully reflect the range of concerns and uncertainties relevant to the
decision-making problem under study. They should cover and reflect those
uncertainties which may materially affect the decisions to be made within that
problem. They need to be defined in consultation with, and owned by, the decision-
makers. (Sections 2.2, 4.1)
Long-term planning should consider many more scenarios and sensitivities and 
considerably greater analysis of the robustness of conclusions against departures 
from these scenarios.  (Sections 4.1)
A reasonable way of proceeding would be the definition of:
• a set of core scenarios, which should cover the likely views of the future with 
a high degree of confidence; each of these could be analysed in some 
detail, and the set of such scenarios used to identify a set of good or near
"optimal" policies or decisions; these core scenarios should be consistent
with the need to meet legally-binding carbon reduction targets;
• a further set of non-core or extreme scenarios, representing the many other
less likely possible evolutions of the future -- including, particularly, things 
which might go wrong; these latter scenarios might be used to test the
robustness of those decisions suggested by the core scenarios; non-core 
scenarios could examine the effects of failures to meet legally-binding 
carbon reduction targets.
There would typically be no need to analyse the non-core extreme scenarios to the 
same degree of detail, perhaps not even quantitatively, as required for the core 
scenarios. Their purpose would be to identify eventualities which need to be thought 
about, and thus to separate robust from non-robust decisions.  (Sections 2.2, 4.1,
4.4, 4.5, 5)
Analysis
Individual scenarios should be sufficiently well specified that uncertainties within
each scenario may be treated probabilistically. Probabilistically unquantifiable
uncertainties should be captured by the specification of separate scenarios 
corresponding to each possibility. (Section 4.2)
The iterative aspects of the analytical process should be structured so that not
every possible decision needs to be analysed in detail with respect to every
scenario. In particular many possible decisions might be rapidly ruled out at an 
early stage. (Sections 2.2, 4.1)
            
    
  
    
 
    
   
 
  
       
  
   
  
     
       
   




The analytical process requires the recognition that decisions are properly made at
those times at which it is optimal to do so, and thus analysis needs to be structured 
sequentially by identifying times at which future relevant information may become 
available. (Section 4.3)
Sensitivity and robustness analysis 
The robustness of decisions against variations of assumptions and uncertainties, 
and the sensitivities of these decisions to parameter variations should all be fully 
tested.  Graphical analyses can assist in this and consideration should be given to
the provision of interactive tools to enable decision makers to carry out easily their
own further explorations, e.g. Bayesian sensitivity analyses. (Sections 5.1, 5.2)
Decision-making criteria
It is our view that, especially in the context of long-term decision-making in which
deep uncertainties are present, there is no simplistic or “automated” method of 
analysis for the management of these uncertainties so as to arrive at an optimal
decision. (We are particularly concerned about the use of least worst regret
analysis in this context.) Rather, as discussed in the rest of this report, judgements
are required at many stages in the decision-making process. (Section 5.3)
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1 Introduction
Britain's energy systems must evolve rapidly so as to meet future requirements, and
to do so in way which ensures the country can meet its legally-binding carbon 
reduction targets – in particular that of net-zero by 2050. A consequence of the 
latter is that there is likely to be a much greater dependence on electricity, and that 
much of this may be generated from renewables. Further fundamental changes,
such as a move from natural gas to hydrogen, perhaps much wider use of district
heating schemes, and greater use of electric vehicles have varying degrees of 
likelihood, but some will happen. These will necessitate massive changes in the
country's energy infrastructure, in terms of both capacity and the ability to manage a
system with much increased day-to-day variability and uncertainty. To meet what
may be a two to fourfold increase in demand for electricity, there will need to be an
increase in capacity of the national grid and/or a much-increased emphasis on local
generation.1 
This rapid evolution of energy systems in a world in which technological change is 
also very rapid introduces much greater uncertainty into the infrastructure planning 
and decision-making processes than has hitherto been the case. This requires a
more flexible and interactive approach to such decision-making than the relatively
mechanistic methodologies currently used. Analysts, stakeholder and decision-
makers will need to interact more closely to share understandings and develop a
comprehensive agreed strategy to achieve the country’s net-zero carbon ambitions.
Decision-makers will need much more information on the consequences of different
elements of the strategy and of varying modelling and analytical assumptions.
Notably, decision-makers need to be able to understand the robustness of their
decisions given the many uncertainties faced, where the term robustness is to be
understood in its everyday sense of meaning that these decisions continue to be
good under variations in these uncertainties and in other assumptions.
Ofgem will have a key role to play in all this in advising government on the role of 
regulation within long term national strategies, while regulating the country’s energy 
systems in the shorter term so that they can be developed in line with whatever
long-term net-zero carbon strategy is adopted. This is a herculean task which
challenges Ofgem’s current establishment and operating practices in many ways,
two being particularly significant.
1. There will be a clear need for Ofgem to undertake more analysis than 
previously, when it was concerned solely with issues related to shorter term
regulation. Its analyses rely on the Future Energy Scenarios (FES) developed at
National Grid. As we shall discuss, this very much limits the perspectives and 
analyses that Ofgem can use in its regulatory function.
2. If a longer view on the path to net-zero carbon is to be taken, Ofgem,
independently or with other government agencies and departments, needs to 
take more control of the development of scenarios and consider a much wider
range of these, including broad brush ones of much lesser detail than the four 
FES.
In the following, we discuss our reasoning behind these assertions. We begin with a
broad overview of some basic concepts and issues that arise in developing sound,
auditable decisions, particularly those that address deep, long-term uncertainties
(see particularly Section 3.3). We then use these to explain our – necessarily broad 
– advice to Ofgem on decision-making in its regulatory role and on how it should 
develop its longer-term advice to Government on the role of regulation in achieving 
the UK’s net-zero carbon targets.
          
   
      
        
   
  
   
 
  
   
  
  
   
     
        
 
     
    
 
         
      
     
    
        
 
   
     
           
          
     
     
     
       
     
           
    
    
       
 
  
   
      
      
  
Some of our recommendations, if accepted, would involve considerable additional
resource and so might well take time to implement. However, other
recommendations – in particular, those relating to analysis and decision-making –
would be capable of being acted on immediately.
2 Management of Uncertainty
2.1.1 Nature of uncertainty
We enlarge on here a distinction made in an earlier report, as to some 
fundamentally different types of uncertainty which need to be thought about and
managed separately2.
2.1.2 Stochastic Uncertainties
Stochastic uncertainties relate to randomness in the environment and populations
and are reasonably capable of being probabilistically quantified and modelled, given 
a knowledge of the backgrounds against which they occur. They include such things 
as adverse weather conditions (severe winter or summer weather, sustained 
periods of no wind, flooding, etc), unusual patterns of demand, generator and 
network failures, and variations in populations. For varying reasons, these
uncertainties are likely to be greater in the future than at present. For example,
climate change will increase the variability of weather conditions, while increased 
renewable generation will increase the variability of supplies. Depending on how it is
managed, the recharging of electric vehicles may either increase or smooth 
variabilities in the demand process. The management of such probabilistic
uncertainties is relatively uncontroversial in principle, in that this is a matter of 
correctly estimating and assigning joint probability distributions. This process,
however, may still present a very considerable challenge; and will need increased
resource in terms of increased ongoing data collection and analysis.
2.1.3 Epistemic Uncertainties
Epistemic (or epistemological) uncertainties relate to a lack of knowledge: e.g.
whether a hydrogen energy system will develop by 2030 with, say, 20% of transport
and 10% of domestic heating so fuelled. Uncertainties about the values of
parameters in a model are also epistemic; as, indeed, is any uncertainty about the 
appropriateness of the model to use in a particular context. Such uncertainties are
not stochastic, but they can be modelled probabilistically if a Bayesian3 perspective 
on probability is taken. Computational advances and many applications having
shown over recent decades that Bayesian ideas are feasible, efficient and in tune 
with decision makers’ needs. However, there are some issues when epistemic
uncertainties are deep4 . Uncertainties are deep when there is little agreement
between all parties to a decision (decision makers, stakeholders, experts) on the 
appropriate models to use and the probability distributions to use to describe the 
uncertainties on key parameters. Moreover, deep uncertainties are characterised by
the need to make a decision before the disagreements over the uncertainties can
be resolved.
2.1.4 Social, Economic and Political Uncertainties
These are many uncertainties that are simply not capable of being objectively 
quantified – whether probabilistically or in any other way – but whose relative 
plausibilities need nevertheless to be considered. These also include uncertainties 
that it would be inappropriate to attempt to quantify, in that this would involve, for 
        
   
             
  
    
            
      
         
             
   
           
    
              
       
    
               
       
 
          
    
   
         
      
       
      
  
   
 
             
            
   
     
          
    
             
   
      
   
        
             
      
             
 
     
      
          
       
       
   
example, the second-guessing of government or other public policy. Many involve
significant ambiguities that can only be resolved by discussion and deliberation.
Such uncertainties may also be deep in that they may be very significant
disagreements between the parties to the decision.
2.2 Uncertainties and scenarios
Complex decisions dealing with outcomes that stretch years or decades into the
future inevitably involve many deep uncertainties. Our knowledge of what events
may happen and affect outcomes many years from now is far from complete.
Moreover, in many cases we may not be entirely clear about how we will value 
outcomes when they happen, simply because we have not imagined the situation.
For instance, the coronavirus lockdown has changed many people’s and employers’
views on home working and their preferences may well be different to what they 
would have said only a few months ago – less dramatic examples would include the
development of entirely new technologies, or recent instances of very rapid price 
reductions of existing technologies such as solar power and offshore wind power.
One of the ways that analysts can help in exploring decisions in face of deep
uncertainties is to explore several scenarios5. Scenarios may be developed in
which:
• Some key deep uncertainties are fixed at ‘interesting’ values. Interesting
values may be identified in many ways:
- outcomes that decision makers and/or stakeholders find particularly 
worrying or attractive, i.e. reasonable worst or best cases;
- a best guess scenario, i.e. if things go as much as planned;
- outcomes that would follow if some dramatic, but unlikely event
happened, e.g. a further pandemic or the advent of fusion energy.
• It is also valuable to create scenarios which capture specific value/cultural
perspectives and thus capture the perspectives of particular groups of
stakeholders.
Note that although such scenarios look like events on which probabilities may be
defined, it is in general impossible to choose sufficient scenarios as to completely
span or partition the future. Thus even a Bayesian analysis in which probabilities 
are formally assigned to scenarios to permit some form of averaging is problematic.
(See, however, Section 5.2 where we explore the idea of using flexible Bayesian
analyses as part of a robustness analysis.)
Within each scenario, i.e. using the assumptions embodied in that scenario, it is
possible to build full probability and decision models to explore how different
strategies may play out. The idea of such scenario-focused decision analyses is to
provide information to the decision makers and make them aware of the potential
upsides and downsides of different strategies. Attractive strategies will be those
which perform well across all (or most) of the scenarios, although perhaps not
optimally in any of them. Such strategies exhibit robustness.
Such analyses will only have value to the decision-makers and their advisors if the
range of scenarios capture their concerns. It is important, therefore, that they are 
fully involved in the definition and construction of the scenarios: the decision-makers
and their advisors need to own them. Note that it is not necessary to define all the
scenarios to the same level or detail. Some may be very helpful, even if only
roughly drawn, in identifying weaknesses or strengths of different strategies. Thus
some – perhaps many – strategies may be eliminated without detailed and
expensive full analysis.
   
     
            
          
  
    
     
         
        
        
              
          
           
 
               
 
         
      
  
     
         
      
     
  
             
      
  
       
             
 
      
             







3.1 Management of decision-making processes
The process of decision-making can be divided in three broad phases though that is
not to suggest that the process is linear6. Generally the process iterates within and
between phases as one’s thinking about one issue catalyses further thoughts about 
other issues, or reflections during one phase indicate that other issues should have 
been considered in an earlier one. See Figure 1.
Sense-Making and
Modelling 




Figure 1: The Decision Analysis Process
Note: the process is seldom linear. Rather it iterates back and forward both
within the three stages and between them as insights build and omissions in
the model and analysis are recognised.
• Sense-making and Modelling. The first step in any decision is a sense-
making process of identifying issues, objectives, stakeholders, possible
actions and their consequences, etc. Once they are identified, stakeholders
may be invited to join the process to ensure that issues that matter to them 
are addressed. The process also determines the scope and boundaries of
the subsequent analyses. Only at this stage is it possible to build a
quantitative model.
• Analysing and Exploring. Once a model is built, it needs to be explored and
analysed in relation to the study’s objectives, building understanding.
Sensitivity and robustness analyses may – should – supplement the decision 
analysis, setting bounds on some of the residual uncertainty. During the
process, the model should be validated as much as possible against 
available data and the decision-makers and stakeholders’ perceptions.
• Interpreting and Implementing. The results and guidance offered by the
analysis need to be interpreted into real world actions. This requires that the
decision-makers and analysts make a judgement whether the analysis is 
requisite for the decision, guiding them to a consensus on the way forward.
They need to judge whether the model, the analysis and the conclusions are
fit for their purposes. They will also need to communicate the decision to 
stakeholders and implement the actions.
In the case of more operational, regular decisions, the first sense-making phase is 
less important because the relevant issues will be very similar to last time. For
      
 
  
        
  
     
    
      
           
            
  
            
   
       
  
              
       
               
     
           
  
     
         
            
 
  
     
    
  
            
  
    
          
     
        
      
 
          
       
 
 
    
 
   
  
    
    
   
      
Ofgem, although one would not like to suggest that its planning, development and 
regulatory decisions are entirely of the same structure as last time, there are many
similarities.
This is not the same case as that for thinking through its position on the move to
net-zero carbon systems, which requires entirely fresh analysis and deliberation.
For such long-term, complex decisions, the initial sense-making and modelling
phase is particularly important to ensure that all relevant issues are included in the 
analysis and subsequent deliberation. During this phase, there will be a need to
include the views of many stakeholders within government, the energy industries,
consumers and the public. This means that there will be a need for several or
perhaps many workshops to explore and capture their views, agreeing on the 
issues to be included and those that can be omitted. Later in the decision process,
there will be less need for workshops or other face-to-face interactions. But there
will be a need for ongoing communication.
3.2 Decision-making and Analysis
The need to meet societal objectives will probably mean that a more strategic and
coordinated management of the entire decision-making process will be required.
The first point to consider is the size of the analysis and how much of the analysis 
needs to be done in house if Ofgem is to both fulfil its various functions and also 
advise government on how these functions may need to change to guide the UK’s
energy systems towards net-zero carbon in line with the government’s agenda. At
present, Ofgem addresses its planning, development and regulatory functions by 
drawing on the four National Grid FES scenarios. However these scenarios are only
just beginning to recognize the major infrastructure changes that will be required by
the move to net-zero carbon, and from the FES documentation it is unclear to what 
extent the scenarios have been developed with the purpose of network planning in
mind.  They will therefore require much further, and quite urgent, development.  
Further, such are the future uncertainties, that a larger number of scenarios will
need to be considered, and this number will necessarily increase in the case of
longer-term decision-making.
Successful modelling and analysis requires a combination of skills, including, in this
case, detailed energy systems knowledge along with the mathematical and 
statistical skills required to manage the many uncertainties involved. For the
modelling necessary for thinking about future energy systems and infrastructure,
and for the reasons discussed in Section 3.1, almost certainly a larger group of
analysts – including representatives of Ofgem – are needed than are at present
used. These analysts need to talk to the decision-makers both before and during
the analytical process, so as to identify the primary objective(s) of interest, and
agree a detailed approach. This process needs to include the formal identification
of key uncertainties and the explicit identification of how these will be investigated.
In particular, decision makers and analysts need to ensure that the scenarios used
to support the deliberations allow exploration of all Ofgem’s concerns.  Appropriate
robustness and sensitivity analyses need to be agreed. Ideally, there should be
ongoing discussion between analysts and decision makers, again as discussed in
Section 3.1; at a minimum, there should be a good reporting process in place -- see 
Section 3.3.
Overall our view is that, in order to fulfil its likely future obligations in ensuring that 
the evolution of energy infrastructure is compatible with the transition to net-zero 
carbon emissions, it will be essential that Ofgem, BEIS and other government 
agencies have more broad strategic control of the evolution of the entire decision-
making process because it will shape the early stages of the UK’s net-zero strategy.
    
  
      
    
          
 
          
  
           
  
         
    
   
 
   
  
  
   
  
  
   
          
          
  
  
     
   
         
       
    
  
    




    
  
    





3.3 Documentation of Analyses
Continual iterative discussion between decision-makers, stakeholders, scientific and
economic experts and analysts can be very difficult under the current division of
responsibilities, since these groups of people often belong to different organisations
and are seldom co-located. Moreover, there is a continual changeover of personnel
across Government departments and agencies and within the energy companies 
concerned. This situation greatly increases the need for very thorough
documentation of analysis, including the basis of assumptions built into the 
modelling. Clear documentation provides an audit trail and the reasoning behind the
decision which is often needed during the implementation phase for clarification of
some issues. Documentation need to be transparent, therefore, ideally to the same
standards of transparency as in the case of a scientific paper submitted for peer-
review, and the analytic results should be capable, if necessary, of being checked 
and reproduced.
In particular, within the documentation, and for the reasons discussed elsewhere in 
this report, there need to be precise definitions and specifications of:
- models,
- variables and relationships between them,
- assumptions and parameter values,
- scenario space,
- decision space,
- constraints (e.g. security-of-supply, carbon reduction targets),
- decision-making criteria (e.g. the minimisation of an expected economic
cost, or of a worst regret, or the maximisation of an NPV, in all cases subject
to meeting the specified constraints),
- robustness analysis.
4 Scenario definition and analysis
4.1 Scenario definition
It is important that scenarios provide sufficient coverage of possible futures, 
including (particularly) unforeseen eventualities (e.g. unavailable nuclear power or
other technologies, non-availability of energy supplies - gas or electricity - from
abroad). When infrastructure or other decisions have consequences lasting well into 
the future, then the scenarios used for the corresponding decision-making process
need to run at least that far into the future and to cover sufficiently the range of 
possibilities throughout the entire time period concerned. This has a number of
important consequences:
1. the scenarios to be considered are particular to the problem at hand and
reflect those uncertainties which may materially affect the decisions to be 
made within that problem;
2. long-term planning, e.g. of network infrastructure, involves many more and
very much greater uncertainties, than short-term decision-making. e.g.
provision of margin; in consequence long-term planning requires the
consideration of many more scenarios and sensitivities and considerably 
greater robustness analysis;
3. similarly long-term planning involves deep uncertainties which cannot simply
be treated by routine analytical procedures.
      
             
        
     
  
         
   
      
          
      
      
     
     
    
          
        
 
    
       
    
       
  
         
   
    
    
  
    
  
    
 
               
   
    
     
   
 
  
              
  
 
         
   
   
      
 
         
   
   
It seems that at present the Future Energy Scenarios (FES) developed by National
Grid are used for almost all aspects of decision-making throughout the industry and
over all time periods. However, there are currently only four FES. While these may 
provide sufficient coverage for some short-term decision-making – such as that
associated with capacity adequacy and the capacity markets, where one is not
looking more than a few years into the future and the scenario and decision spaces 
are essentially one-dimensional – they seem quite inadequate in providing the
coverage required for infrastructure decision-making where the consequences of
particular decisions persist for maybe 40 or more years. Moreover, it is important to
note that the FES were not developed to support regulatory decisions alone, or
even with that as their primary purpose. National Grid needs such scenarios for its
internal planning, as does the rest of the industry. It is possible, therefore, that they
may not sufficiently cover those uncertainties which are relevant to regulatory and 
other societal interests for which Ofgem has responsibility.
Thus, our view is that, for planning further ahead than a very small number of years,
many more scenarios are needed to provide adequate coverage of future 
possibilities and eventualities, though as noted some scenarios may be developed
in more detail than others. One might reasonably proceed by defining7:
• a set of core scenarios, which should cover the likely views of the future with 
a high degree of confidence; each of these could be analysed in some detail,
and the set of such scenarios used to identify a set of good or near "optimal"
policies or decisions;
• a further set of non-core or extreme scenarios (or sensitivities), representing 
the many other, but less likely, possible evolutions of the future -- including,
particularly, things which might go wrong (as suggested above); these latter
scenarios might be used to test the robustness of those decisions suggested 
by the core scenarios; there would typically be no need to specify, analyse 
or cost these extreme scenarios to the same degree of detail as required for 
the core scenarios. Their purpose would be to identify eventualities which 
needed to be thought about, and thus to separate robust from non-robust 
decisions.
With regard to the feasibility of analysing more scenarios than at present, it needs to
be remembered (a) that very much more computing power has become available in 
recent years and also that thoughtful analytical approaches – or even better
computer coding – can often greatly reduce the volume of computation required, (b)
as suggested above, not every scenario or sensitivity needs to be analysed in fine 
detail.
4.2 Analysis
As is implicit in the foregoing discussion, analysis is almost inevitably based on the
consideration of scenarios, and on the interactions between scenarios and possible 
decisions.
We believe that individual scenarios should be sufficiently well specified that
uncertainties within each scenario may be treated probabilistically. Thus all
probabilistically unquantifiable uncertainties – corresponding to, e.g., possible 
political or economic directions, or to possible extreme events – need to be 
captured in the specification of separate scenarios corresponding to each 
possibility. Anything else, involving unquantifiable uncertainties both within and
between scenarios, is almost certain to lead to an analytically intractable situation.
(See also the discussion Section 4.3.)
    
             
    
 
          
            
        
    
            
   
   
    
  
    
    
            
      
 
    
   
   
  
          
               
   
          
     
 
      
     
           
   
   
   
        
 
          
      
     
      
     
         
            
       
  
  
4.3 Treatment of time
Since uncertainty is something which evolves over time, this needs to be taken
account of within any analysis. In particular, decisions need to be made at those
times at which it is optimal to do so, and thus analysis needs to be structured by 
identifying times at which future relevant information may become available.
A very simple example is given by considering an infrastructure decision in which
there are three possibilities: (a) build immediately, (b) build in 1 year's time, (c)
never build. If more information is to become available in a year's time, then the only 
immediate decision required is whether to (a) build immediately, (b) postpone any
decision for 1 year. Within a probabilistic environment, this involves comparing the 
cost (or perhaps NPV8) of building now, with the expected total cost under a year's
postponement. (An elementary probabilistic inequality shows that the latter will
always be less than would be the case if the further decision were to be made 
immediately.) Hence, in this particular example, the decision space for the
immediate problem is binary.
Again within a probabilistic environment, the same philosophy may be extended to
multiple future decision points – formally the analysis is that of stochastic dynamic
programming.
A (rare) special case occurs when, within a scenario, no further information 
becomes available as time progresses. In this case one may assume that all
decisions within that scenario may be made immediately. (This is effectively what
happens within current analyses for determining procurement within the GB
Capacity Market, where the optimal procurement for the 4-year ahead market is 
made, without the analysis being able to take any account of the possibility of an
adjustment in the 1-year ahead market.)
However, there is no entirely consistent analytical way to handle the evolution of
uncertainty over time outside of a probabilistic treatment. This reinforces the earlier
recommendation to deal with non-probabilistically quantifiable uncertainties through
a process of informed judgement based on the definition of separate scenarios.
4.4 Analysis of multiple scenarios
The difficulties of combining multiple scenarios in decision-making are well known:
on the one hand, the relative likelihoods of these scenarios obviously matter, and in 
particular, very unlikely scenarios need to be identified as such. On the other hand, 
since the scenarios have not been defined to form a mutually exclusive partition of
the possible futures, it may be extremely difficult or conceptually impossible to
assign probabilities to scenarios9.
One way of proceeding might be as suggested in Section 4.1, via the identification
of a set of core scenarios which might be regarded as a representative set of "equi-
plausible" evolutions of the future and which could be analysed in detail, (with plenty
of robustness analysis), to obtain a set of good – or close to optimal – possible 
decisions. In addition, one would define (again as suggested earlier) a set of non-
core or extreme scenarios, which would include all unfortunate eventualities, which
would not need to be analysed in such great detail, and which could be used to 
further test the robustness of possible decisions. See also the further discussion of
Section 5.
 
    
            
   
       
     
   
     
  
 
   
   
            
    
 
             
  
    
         
  
      
       
     
    
   
    
   
    
        
 
     
             
 
         
         
     
  
 
        
    
      
 
   
            
4.5 Need to respect legally-binding carbon reduction targets
This is of course a major issue, which – where relevant - should properly place 
constraints on any analysis. One possibility, if one proceeds as suggested above 
via the definition of "core" and "non-core" scenarios, is that the former should all be 
compliant with meeting these legally-binding targets (so that primary analysis does
not attempt some even-handed compromise between meeting and not meeting 
them). It is, however, necessary to explore what happens if these legally-binding 
targets are for some reason not met. This might be done through the definition of
appropriate non-core scenarios, whose consequences could be thus explored10.
5 Sensitivity and robustness analysis
5.1 Sensitivity analysis for parameters
There is a need to provide information on the sensitivity, or robustness, of decisions 
to individual parameter assumptions11. In general, this would most sensibly be done
graphically, e.g. with plots of how suggested decisions might change as parameters
were varied. This could then be used to suggest decisions which are robust against
parameter variation.
It is further necessary to understand -- either analytically or through experimentation 
-- how parameter assumptions interact with each other. Again results might be
presented with appropriate graphical analyses.
5.2 Sensitivity to relative likelihoods of scenarios
For the reasons discussed in Section 2, it is not desirable that one should assign a
single set of probabilities to the various scenarios considered. Nevertheless, again
as mentioned earlier, the relative likelihoods of scenarios do need to be taken into
consideration. It might therefore make sense to provide interactive tools to enable
decision-makers to perform their own Bayesian sensitivity analysis by exploring the
consequences of assigning varying probabilities12 to scenarios and looking at how
the optimal decision under a Bayesian analysis would then vary.
This generalises the idea – found for example within the NOA analysis – of
calculating switching probabilities, so as to examine the effect of varying the relative
likelihoods of just two scenarios.
However, there is one further problem we should mention here. Within scenarios, a
full Bayesian analysis will produce a ranking of options based upon the ordering of
expected utilities. However, the utilities within scenarios are not necessarily
comparable numerically across scenarios13. This will require that care is taken to
check that no scenario represents such a dramatic change from the present that it is 
unreasonable to expect that the government’s and society’s values remain the 
same.
5.3 Least worst regret (LWR) analysis and weighting of scenarios
LWR analysis is often proposed as a way of comparing the outcomes of scenarios 
across different strategies. A claimed advantage of such analysis is that it does not
require consideration to be made of the relative likelihoods or plausibilities of the
scenarios considered, so that LWR analysis is often regarded as “objective”.  
However, we are very uncomfortable with this. First, the outcome of an LWR 
   
    
   
       
        
      
 
   
          
        
      
       
      
  
   
  
   
  
      
         
  
   
   
    
               
      
     
    
     
     
           
          
        
 
               
     
 
     
          
    
       
             
   
    
           
analysis is determined entirely by the set of scenarios chosen for inclusion in the 
analysis, and indeed is usually almost entirely determined by a very small number
of “critical” scenarios that are in some way (which can be made mathematically 
precise) extreme.14 However, the choice of scenarios to be included in an analysis 
is not an objective one, and indeed the choice of the more extreme scenarios which
are critical to the outcome of the analysis may be made by analysts who are quite
remote from the decision owner without the necessary statement of purpose to
guide the scenario specification, or through a perceived need to sufficiently populate 
the scenario space.15 Further, this small number of critical scenarios may not reflect
all the risks that are represented across all scenarios. During implementation of a
LWR strategy, such risks may be forgotten. Finally, if the critical scenarios that 
determine the outcome of LWR analysis are particularly optimistic or pessimistic
about the future, it may lead to a decision that performs poorly in the circumstances 
that actually occur.
LWR analysis also assumes that all preferences are comparable across scenarios 
and this, as we have suggested, may be an unreasonable assumption in some 
circumstances, particular when facing long-term futures during which there may be
dramatic changes to society.
As mentioned above, LWR analysis simply takes no account of beliefs as to relative 
likelihoods of scenarios, however informal these may be16. Yet such beliefs matter
and need to be formally or informally incorporated within any analysis. Frequently 
this is implicitly done within the choice of scenario set itself.
It is our view that, especially in the context of long-term decision-making in which
deep uncertainties are present, there is no “automated” method of analysis for the 
management of these uncertainties so as to arrive at an optimal decision. Rather, it
is necessary to proceed as we have outlined in the rest of this report – see,
especially, Section 4 – so that, inevitably, judgements are required at many stages 
in the decision-making process.
5.4 Unmodelled considerations and constraints
There are also important considerations whose incorporation within a formal
modelling and analysis process may unduly complicate the latter. Typically, these
will be practical constraints: e.g., where the preferred outcome suggested by an
analysis is nevertheless not manageable in practice, perhaps because it would
require too many changes to be made at once.
Again a reasonable approach is to let the more formal analysis suggest a range of
"good", or near-optimal, options, and to test the robustness of these against these 
further unmodelled considerations.
5.5 Management of multiple objectives
Bayesian approaches deal with multiple objectives by the use of multi-attribute 
value and utility functions17. These allow for trade-offs between different objectives 
including varying marginal value along each objective. Risk attitude is also
modelled. However, since the key issue faced by Ofgem relates to how it addresses
uncertainties in its planning, development and regulatory roles and its formulating its 
perspective and advice on policies for moving the UK energy system towards Net-
Zero Carbon, we do not discuss multiple objectives in detail here.
    
       
       
  
    
      
 
       
           
      
            
     
   
       
   
    
     
           
        
 
     
  
              
             
  
         
          
   
   
        
      
    
           
       
      
  
   
       
           
      
              
 
           
 
  
6 Robust decision-making (RDM) approach
An apparently somewhat different approach to decision-making – originating largely
from within the Rand Corporation – has been advocated in recent years by various 
authors18. This approach is usually referred to as robust decision making (RDM), 
and focuses on the early identification of robust strategies, i.e. those likely to 
perform well across a wide variety of possible evolutions of the future. These are 
then explored in further detail.
The distinction between RDM and more traditional approaches is, to a large extent,
a matter of emphasis. In all cases we have (explicitly or implicitly) a scenario space 
(set of possible evolutions of the external environment) and a decision space.
Associated with each possible scenario and each possible decision is a future
evolution and a cost. Again in all cases, the objective is to find a decision which 
works well across multiple scenarios.
The RDM approach both permits more flexible, and perhaps more efficient,
navigation towards a good decision. In particular many decisions can be ruled out at
an early stage without being evaluated in detail under every scenario, as they 
perform sufficiently badly under at least some circumstances. The approach also 
helps to identify possibilities (within the, possibly very broad, scenario space) which
might not have been thought about in advance.
It therefore seems to us that the benefits of the explicit RDM approach are primarily 
those of efficiency within the decision-making process. However, the RDM
approach requires a very high level of interaction between analysts and decision-
makers, and this is not easy when the two groups belong to separate organisations.
The approach is something towards which Ofgem might well work in the future. In
the absence of this, what is important is that there exists the kind of cooperation 
between analysts and decision-makers which we have discussed in this report, and,
most especially, that analysts provide the decision-makers with the right tools to
perform their own flexible analyses.
7 Recommendations and Conclusion
Drawing out discussion together we would make the following recommendations
Ofgem's role in future infrastructure decision-making
In order to fulfil its future planning, development and regulatory functions
within the rapid evolution of Britain's energy infrastructure, and to ensure
sound, auditable decision-making, Ofgem should take more control of
the analytical and decision-making processes themselves. Particularly it
needs to ensure that these are correctly aligned with consumer and 
societal objectives. (Section 1)
Management of the analytical and decision-making processes
Serious thought should be given to the structuring and management of
the analysis and decision-making processes. Ofgem should ensure that
it has sufficient control of these so as to be able to ensure that they
satisfy its planning, development and regulatory requirements.  Analysis, 
including the scenarios to be used and the robustness and sensitivity
analysis to be performed, needs to be agreed between decision makers 
and analysts in advance, and larger analysis teams are likely to be 
 
        
 
             
 
    
   
    
    
          
           
    
    
  
     
  
      
      
   
   
         
 
 
   
     
         
       
 
   
            
      
 
        
    
     
   
  
    
         
    




   
        
required.  In particular, there needs to be provision for ongoing
interaction between all the parties involved. (Sections 3.1, 3.2)
Uncertainties 
At the outset of any project, uncertainties should be clearly set out and
their natures determined.  The methods of handling these uncertainties 
should be agreed. Deep uncertainties (those which may not or should 
not be probabilistically quantified) will require a particularly considered 
approach to their analysis. (Section 2.1)
Need for thorough documentation of analysis 
Very clear and complete documentation should be provided of all
modelling and analysis. This should include full specification of models,
assumptions, scenario and decision spaces, objectives, constraints,
decision-making criteria, and robustness and sensitivity analysis. The 
standard of documentation should be such that the analysis is fully 
capable of being reproduced, and the conclusions verified. (Section 3.3)
Scenario definition 
Scenarios should fully reflect the range of concerns and uncertainties
relevant to the decision-making problem under study. They should
cover and reflect those uncertainties which may materially affect the 
decisions to be made within that problem. They need to be defined in 
consultation with, and owned by, the decision-makers. (Sections 2.2,
4.1)
Long-term planning should consider many more scenarios and
sensitivities and considerably greater analysis of the robustness of
conclusions against departures from these scenarios. (Sections 4.1)
A reasonable way of proceeding would be the definition of:
• a set of core scenarios, which should cover the likely views of the 
future with a high degree of confidence; each of these could be
analysed in some detail, and the set of such scenarios used to 
identify a set of good or near "optimal" policies or decisions; these
core scenarios should be consistent with the need to meet legally-
binding carbon reduction targets;
• a further set of non-core or extreme scenarios, representing the many 
other less likely possible evolutions of the future -- including,
particularly, things which might go wrong; these latter scenarios might
be used to test the robustness of those decisions suggested by the 
core scenarios; non-core scenarios could examine the effects of
failures to meet legally-binding carbon reduction targets.
There would typically be no need to analyse the non-core extreme 
scenarios to the same degree of detail, perhaps not even quantitatively,
as required for the core scenarios. Their purpose would be to identify
eventualities which need to be thought about, and thus to separate 
robust from non-robust decisions.  (Sections 2.2, 4.1, 4.4, 4.5, 5)
Analysis
Individual scenarios should be sufficiently well specified that 
uncertainties within each scenario may be treated probabilistically.
Probabilistically unquantifiable uncertainties should be captured by the
   
 
          
 
      
       




         
   
      
 
     
  
 
           
 
    
          
            
      
 
 
              
         
   
               
          
 
  
        
      
          
  
   
        
   
 
 
     
   
          
            
    
  
specification of separate scenarios corresponding to each possibility.
(Section 4.2)
The iterative aspects of the analytical process should be structured so
that not every possible decision needs to be analysed in detail with
respect to every scenario.  In particular many possible decisions might 
be rapidly ruled out at an early stage. (Sections 2.2, 4.1)
The analytical process requires the recognition that decisions are
properly made at those times at which it is optimal to do so, and thus 
analysis needs to be structured sequentially by identifying times at which 
future relevant information may become available.  (Section 4.3)
Sensitivity and robustness analysis 
The robustness of decisions against variations of assumptions and
uncertainties, and the sensitivities of these decisions to parameter
variations should all be fully tested. Graphical analyses can assist in 
this and consideration should be given to the provision of interactive 
tools to enable decision makers to carry out easily their own further 
explorations, e.g. Bayesian sensitivity analyses. (Sections 5.1, 5.2)
Decision-making criteria
It is our view that, especially in the context of long-term decision-making
in which deep uncertainties are present, there is no simplistic or
“automated” method of analysis for the management of these
uncertainties so as to arrive at an optimal decision. (We are particularly 
concerned about the use of least worst regret analysis in this context.)
Rather, as discussed in the rest of this report, judgements are required
at many stages in the decision-making process. (Section 5.3)
In summary, we have considerable concerns about the current approach to
developing regulation, particularly in relation to the overreliance on the four FES
scenarios. Moreover, we do not see how the current process can extend to address
much longer term decision making on the move to net-zero carbon over the coming 
decades. We are aware that the availability of analytic effort within Ofgem is limited, 
with staff already working to capacity. Thus in the short term, we recognise that the
planning for next regulation round must necessarily continue along the lines used
previously, though some additional guidance within current frameworks may be
possible. In any case, the energy industry is expecting that and any radical change
to the process might be resisted. However, we do recommend that Ofgem, perhaps
with other stakeholders across Government, should consider running one or more 
workshops to develop several further qualitative scenarios which would complement
the FES ones in the sense of including potential events and changes that are not
represented within the FES scope. Options and policies for regulation could then be 
considered for robustness against these further scenarios. We would expect this
process to be one of largely qualitative discussion in the standard manner of
scenario planning adopted across much business and government.
In relation to longer-term planning, we would recommend that Ofgem urgently
signals the need to BEIS and other relevant government bodies that the move to net-
zero carbon and Government targets mean that the current approach to the
planning, development and regulation processes may very well not be fit for purpose
in the future. Extra resource needs to allocated now for developing those processes
and signals sent to the energy industry that future regulation rounds may need to be
very different.
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1 See UK Committee on Climate Change. (May 2019).
2 There are many typologies of uncertainty, each emphasizing some character or potential
use of the concept, e.g. French (1995), Ganger Morgan and Henrion (1990). The three
given here are sufficient for this discussion.
3 The Bayesian approach applies across statistical, risk and decision analysis and is
described, discussed and justified in, e.g,, Bedford and Cooke (2001), French and Rios 
Insua (2000), French et al (2009), Singpurwalla (2006), Smith (2010) and Turkman et al 
(2019). In our view, the Bayesian approach provides the most appropriate methodology
for Ofgem to follow. It has been justified and validated in many ways. It:
(i) provides the most comprehensive approach dealing with uncertainty and value
judgements in very sophisticated models;
(ii) provides compatible and coherent techniques of statistical, risk and decision
analysis;
(iii) is based on a well-established and explicit set of principles of rationality;
(iv) can draw in evidence both in the forms of hard data and expert judgement;
(v) allows simpler, compatible sub-models to be used to focus on specific issues;
(vi) is based on considerable experience of use in applications
4 Recent discussions of deep uncertainties are provided in French (2020), Marchau et al
(2019). 
5 It should be noted that ‘scenario’ is a word that is used in several different ways across 
policy and decision analysis, and that this is certainly true in energy policy analysis 
Hughes (2009), Hughes and Strachan (2010). In this note, we use ‘scenario’ in two
compatible ways. Firstly, the FES scenarios (http://fes.nationalgrid.com/) developed and 
maintained by National Grid in which sufficiently detailed assumptions are made about
future supply and demand as well as the UK energy infrastructures to be able to make 
quantitative forecasts about the behaviour of the UK energy system. Secondly, we 
suggest the use of much less detailed, more qualitative scenarios which can be used as a 
backdrop to strategic discussions about the robustness of possible policies: cf. van der
Heijden (1996)
6 Note that there are many discussions and representations of the modelling process 
(Tomlinson and Kiss 2013). Figure 1 emphasises the interactive nature of the process 
and simplifies many specific parts of the process into three broad stages (Holtzman,
1989).
7 See Endnote 5
8 Note that NPV needs to be handled with considerable care over long time horizons, as it 
gives a limited view of the consequences of uncertainty and may discount future costs too 
emphatically.
9 Scenarios may overlap, i.e. share some assumptions, and almost certainly do not span
all possible eventualities. In thinking about futures some decades away this is particularly
true, in 1990, 30 years ago, the web was literally in its infancy, barely imagined and
implemented at CERN. Few outside the realm of science fiction, imagined how it would
underpin all facets our society today. We cannot assume that scenarios that depict
possible paths to Net Zero Carbon in 2050 will cover all possible evolutions. French 
(2020) surveys the literature and discusses what can be assumed by looking at scenarios
in the face of such deep uncertainty and what may not.
10 Note that two of the four FES scenarios are not compliant with the legally-binding targets.
While such is sensible in terms of risk management, it may be less sensible in terms of
setting policy to achieve the targets.
 
     
             
    
                
         
                
  
              
  
    
 
  
              
       
     
  
  
      
   
   
     
  
       
   
         
 
         
    
    
         
      
   
         
    
   
      
   
 
      
        
             
       
     
         
       
 
          
              
   
 
11 French (2003) discusses sensitivity analysis in the context of risk and decision analysis. 
More detailed discussion of sensitivity techniques may be found in Rios Insua (1990),
Saltelli et al (2000).
12 One might think of these not as formal probabilities but importance weights which reflect
how much influence the decision-makers wish to ascribe to particular scenarios. These
weight would reflect not just likelihood, but other factors such as the need of showing that
some extreme but highly unlikely risk has been taken into account (Stewart et al, 2013). 
Whatever the case, the process would form a weighted average across scenarios of the
expected utilities used to rank options within scenarios. Obviously, there should be many 
sensitivity analyses of the informal probabilities/importance weights used and, arguably,
as much attention paid to the robustness of policies across scenarios as to any ranking 
produced by a weighted average of some utility measure across scenarios.
13 See French (2020). Essentially, with very few exceptions values are measured on interval
not ratio scales. Like Fahrenheit, Celius, Reamur and other temperature scales, they 
need a zero and unit to be defined. The problem is that these zeros and units may differ
across scenario because values can change dramatically if a scenario posits a radical
change in society and the environment. We mention elsewhere that the Covid-19 crisis is 
causing substantial reappraisal of individuals’, society’s and governments’ values. So 
before expected utilities or other value scores may be compared across scenarios,
checks on the compatibility of scales must be undertaken.
14 See Zachary (2016)
15 It seems to be sometimes, quite mistakenly, assumed that the decision space within an
analysis should consist only of those decisions each of which is optimal for some
scenario (whereas in reality the best available decision may be good for most scenarios 
but not strictly optimal for any). This may lead to the creation of scenarios for no other
purpose than to create a sufficiently rich decision space.
16 LWR is only one of several simple – one might say naïve – decision criteria that have 
been proposed: e.g. Laplace’s criterion, Hurwicz-a, Savage’s Minimax Regret.  All have
flaws (see, e.g., Luce and Raifa, 1957; French 1986).  Moreover, with the exception of 
LWR and Laplace’s equiprobable weighting, there have been very few applications of any 
in practice. They survive solely perhaps in that they allow simple exercises to be given to
students in elementary OR courses! It should also be noted that LWR and Laplace’s 
equiprobable weighting are not equivalent as is sometimes quite falsely stated.
17 See e.g. French et al (2009), Keeney (1992), and Keeney and Raiffa (1993). Gregory et 
al (2013) discuss how such methods may be used to articulate discussion about
objectives between different stakeholders. Note that while Bayesian approaches use 
multi-attribute value and utility models to address multiple objectives, there are many
other approaches known under the collective heading of multi-criteria decision analysis 
(MCDA): see Belton and Stewart (2002). Some of these methods are compatible with
Bayesian approaches, indeed Bayesian methods are often categorized as MCDA. 
However, some other methods lack such firm foundations.
18 Robust decision-making (RDM) and deep uncertainty are intimately connected in current
developments: see Marchau et al (2019). Much of this literature stems from approaches
developed at the Rand Corporation over several decades. Some RDM approaches are 
essentially Bayesian, but others are not. For instance, Least Worst Analysis may seem 
sensible, but it focuses attention on one aspect of one scenario, and may miss poor
performance on more important aspects of other scenarios. In our report we take a
Bayesian view on RDM and also focus on its process aspects.
Note also that ‘robust’ is another word with multiple uses across areas of decision
analysis. As we use it in this report, we mean that a strategy is robust if it performs
reasonably well across all foreseen scenarios. 
